

*Acting Director / OIT
I would wait
until George H. is in
the chair and then
start talking to IMS
seriously about
this.*

7 March 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, OIT
VIA: Chief, IISG
FROM:
SUBJECT: ALLSTAR Upgrade Concerns

1. I have a concern that IMS will not maximize the use of SAFE technology. In my opinion this is because:

- o The decision process of looking at alternatives is flawed.
 - o Comparisons between the SAFE architecture and competing solutions are not being done on solving the same problem. As an example a large determinant of SAFE costs are hardware, a large portion of the hardware costs are to support VM, a large part of the VM load is AIM. If AIM is not required, the hardware can be scaled back considerably.
 - o The strategic importance of VM as an end-user support environment is not accepted in the DO.
 - o Technical comparisons have been confused with management issues and options.
 - o Working relationships between CSPO (indeed all of OIT) and IMS are less than satisfactory. The burden of this legacy must be shared by both sides. There have been too many instances of OIT not delivering what it promised. CSPO now has a credibility problem with IMS concerning support that in my opinion is undeserved.
 - o There is a strong desire at most levels of management in IMS to control their own environment. This will bias honest technical comparisons.
 - o There are legitimate, thorny issues of project control and development methodology that are not being explored jointly. Thus our input to solving them is missing.

2. I strongly believe that the SAFE architecture is the correct one for the ALLSTAR Upgrade. I also strongly believe in maximizing the Agency's return-on-investment. Therefore I recommend:

- o That through discussions with IMS we try to gain agreement on a strategy that asserts that the SAFE architecture is the strategic direction for IMS unless certain cost and/or technical considerations dictate otherwise. The strategy would define a fixed time period to sort these considerations out. We would recommend to IMS that the DO not commit funds until all the evidence is in. To determine how to make the decision do the following:

- o Acknowledge upfront that it is not clear that SAFE is the "best" answer for the DO because it currently has problems. Thus it is important for SAFE to prove itself. Therefore we need to define criteria with IMS that signifies "success". Do this now, not 6 months from now so that all parties know what the quiz is about. Criteria include specific availability goals and quantified response time goals for defined user scenarios. These scenarios need to be minutely quantified with respect to loading and patterns. Given our benchmarking experience on Delivery 2, we know how to do this. If SAFE does not meet these goals over the next several months, cost the modifications necessary to fix the problems.

- o Agree on the functional requirements that SAFE is supposed to solve in the DO. Cost the modifications necessary to do this and put them on a schedule. Define AIM's role in the Upgrade. Cost the resulting hardware configuration.

- o Do all of the above by 9/1/86. In September make a decision given the developed data and the measured operational experience of Delivery 2. There should be enough time between now and 9/1 for sufficient operational experience to be gained on the running system.

- o Form a joint IMS/CSPO team to do the above. This is necessary to minimize biases on both sides and to improve the working relationships.

- o As a fallback, encourage the continuation of the already begun study on the feasibility of an MVS-only system. Offer to participate.

3. The above discussion attacks technical issues. There are severe management issues that need attention. Immediately:

- o Complete a memorandum-of-understanding. This document must:

- o Define who is in charge. (I recommend that development be

done through CSPO augmented with DO personnel.)

- o Define the priority of DO work versus DI work versus DIA work.

- o Define a cost sharing strategy between the DI and DO - this preferably would have visibility and concurrence at the DD level.

- o Examine the existing Special Center Hardware Plan with an eye to optimizing hardware expenditures assuming that SAFE is coming without actually buying hardware that is SAFE-specific until the final decision is made in September.

- o Jointly work out a funding strategy that ensures that monies will not be lost to the budget process, ensures that sufficient monies are committed to keep a "critical-mass" of developers going, and that takes into account ALLSTAR Upgrade hardware expenditures and OIT's existing budget.

4. In order to minimize long-lead time items, certain actions may be initiated at any time that the risk associated with committing funds is deemed appropriate. Therefore I would suggest formal monthly decision points between now and 9/1 to decide:

- o Whether to direct SAFE contractors to hire against anticipated DO required staffing levels.

- o Whether to actually begin detailed design and/or coding on DO requirements.

5. Finally, a big problem. If IMS goes with the SAFE architecture and development ensues through CSPO, there will be a large morale problem in IMS and working-relationship problems with IMS. To minimize this:

- o IMS managers and workers must be brought into the process of developing SAFE. There are several ways to do this.

- o If the above fails, more drastic solutions concerning personnel changes may need to be considered. I am obviously way off base in discussing this, but I believe that these working relationships are so critical to success that if not corrected can presage failure.

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